David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):324-345 (1999)
Contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by a conception of our propositional attitude concepts as comprising a proto-scientific causal-explanatory theory of behavior. This conception has given rise to a spate of recent worries about the prospects for “naturalizing” the theory. In this paper I return to the roots of the “theory-theory” of the attitudes in Wilfrid Sellars’s classic “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” I present an alternative to the theory-theory’s account of belief in the form of a parody of Sellars’s “Myth of Jones,” one that highlights the normative and pragmatic aspects of this concept and, hopefully, enables us to bypass questions about its physical “realization.”
|Keywords||Attitude Belief Causation Epistemology History Sellars, W|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Andrew Naylor (2012). Belief From the Past. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):598-620.
Jakob Hohwy (2004). The Experience of Mental Causation. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):377 - 400.
Paul W. Taylor (1981). The Ethics of Respect for Nature. Environmental Ethics 3 (3):197-218.
Ernest Sosa (ed.) (1975). Causation and Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
John McDowell (2009). Why is Sellars's Essay Called "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"? In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press
William P. Alston (1983). What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge? Synthese 55 (April):73-96.
Jay L. Garfield (1989). The Myth of Jones and the Mirror of Nature: Reflections on Introspection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (September):1-26.
Ausonio Marras (ed.) (1972). Intentionality, Mind, And Language. London: University Of Illinois Press.
Robert M. Gordon (2000). Sellars's Ryleans Revisited. Protosociology 14:102-114.
James R. O'Shea (2012). The 'Theory Theory' of Mind and the Aims of Sellars' Original Myth of Jones. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):175-204.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads69 ( #52,717 of 1,781,294 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #123,275 of 1,781,294 )
How can I increase my downloads?