Report a bug on this page | Sign in | Create an account
 
PhilPapers home blank

Online research in philosophy


Entries: 207,547  New this week: 121
blank
 General search   Category finder 
advanced search | help | use + and * as usual.
Type words to match in category names
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?

Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.

  • Barrie Falk (1993). Consciousness, Cognition, and the Phenomenal. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67 (67):55-73.
    Consciousness and Content, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar
    4 downloads  |  Added to index:2009-01-27  |  Mark as duplicate |  Delete from index


Discussion of Barrie Falk, Consciousness, cognition, and the phenomenal
Other forums | There are no threads in this forum | Start a new thread First post Latest post Total
Nothing in this forum yet.


Similar books and articles
  • 91.8Stephen Mulhall (1993). Consciousness, Cognition and the Phenomenal--II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67 (67):75-89.
    The Experience of High-Level Properties in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 77.4Michael Thau (2002). Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford University Press.
    This book maintains that our conception of consciousness and cognition begins with and depends upon a few fundamental errors. Thau elucidates these errors by discussing three important philosophical puzzles - Spectrum Inversion, Frege's Puzzle, and Black-and-White Mary - each of which concerns some aspect of either consciousness or cognition. He argues that it has gone unnoticed that each of these puzzles presents the very same problem and, in bringing this commonality to light, the errors in our natural conception of consciousness (...) and cognition are also reviewed. (shrink)
    Consciousness and Content, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this book  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: books.google.com   | Scholar | More..
  • 76.8Kevin J. O'Regan, Erik Myin & No (2001). Toward an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of "Bodiliness" and "Grabbiness". In A. Carsetti (ed.), Seeing and Thinking. Reflections on Kanizsa's Studies in Visual Cognition. Kluwer.
    In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal con- sciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the _problem _of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes.
    The Function of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this book  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: books.google.com springerlink.com   | Scholar | More..
  • 71.7Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2001). Connectionist Vehicles, Structural Resemblance, and the Phenomenal Mind. Communication and Cognition (Special Issue) 34 (1-2):13-38.
    We think the best prospect for a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal consciousness is to be found at the confluence of two influential ideas about the mind. The first is the _computational _ _theory of mind_: the theory that treats human cognitive processes as disciplined operations over neurally realised representing vehicles.1 The second is the _representationalist theory of _ _consciousness_: the theory that takes the phenomenal character of conscious experiences (the “what-it-is-likeness”) to be constituted by their representational content.2 Together these two (...) theories suggest that phenomenal consciousness might be explicable in terms of the representational content of the neurally realised representing vehicles that are generated and manipulated in the course of cognition. The simplest and most elegant hypothesis that one might entertain in this regard is that conscious experiences are identical to (i.e., are one and the same as) the brain’s representing vehicles. (shrink)
    Cognitive Models of Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 71.5David LaBerge (2006). Apical Dendrite Activity in Cognition and Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):235-257.
    Consciousness and Neuroscience, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 71.1Frederick Toates (2006). A Model of the Hierarchy of Behaviour, Cognition, and Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):75-118.
    Cognitive Models of Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 68.0Jesse J. Prinz (2005). Are Emotions Feelings? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25.
    Somatic and Feeling Theories of Emotion in Philosophy of Mind
    Emotions and Feelings in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | More..
  • 67.6Steven Ravett Brown (2000). Reply to Bruce Mangan's Commentary on What Feeling is the "Feeling of Knowing?". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):545-549.
    Metacognition and Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 65.5Joseph Glicksohn (1998). States of Consciousness and Symbolic Cognition. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (2):105-118.
    Consciousness and Content, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 65.5Bruce Mangan (2000). What Feeling is the "Feeling of Knowing?". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):538-544.
    Metacognition and Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | More..




  • Applied ethicsEpistemologyMeta-ethicsMetaphysicsNormative ethics
    Philosophy of biologyPhilosophy of languagePhilosophy of mindPhilosophy of religionMore ...
    Home | Blog | New books and articles | Philosophy journals | Forums | The Categorization Project | About PhilPapers | Contact us
    Sponsored by the Joint Information Systems Committee as part of the
    Information Environment Programme

    Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
    All rights reserved by David Bourget and David Chalmers where applicable.

    loading ..