David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Social Epistemology 21 (3):267 – 280 (2007)
We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group - and sometimes even the group itself - to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective epistemic goals can come into conflict with each other. And I argue that we must appeal to pragmatic considerations in order to resolve such conflicts.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Karl R. Popper (1972). Objective Knowledge. Oxford,Clarendon Press.
Philip Kitcher (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Oxford University Press.
John Stuart Mill (2009). On Liberty. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford University Press 519-522.
David Hume (2009/2004). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), The Monist. Oxford University Press 112.
Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Kopec (2015). A New Group Dutch Book Argument. Ratio 28 (4).
Kristina Rolin (2010). Group Justification in Science. Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
Seumas Miller (2016). Assertions, Joint Epistemic Actions and Social Practices. Synthese 193 (1):71-94.
Seumas Miller (2015). Joint Epistemic Action and Collective Moral Responsibility. Social Epistemology 29 (3):280-302.
Miika Vähämaa (2013). Groups as Epistemic Communities: Social Forces and Affect as Antecedents to Knowledge. Social Epistemology 27 (1):3 - 20.
Similar books and articles
Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2010). On Epistemic Agency. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Heimir Geirsson (2004). Contra Collective Epistemic Agency. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):163-166.
Thomas Kelly (2007). Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474.
Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). Moderate Epistemic Relativism and Our Epistemic Goals. Episteme 4 (1):66-92.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Moderate Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):337-357.
Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst (2008). Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action. Mind 117 (467):549-573.
K. Brad Wray (2001). Collective Belief and Acceptance. Synthese 129 (3):319-33.
Hamid Vahid (2010). Rationalizing Beliefs: Evidential Vs. Pragmatic Reasons. Synthese 176 (3):447-462.
Wayne D. Riggs (2008). Epistemic Risk and Relativism. Acta Analytica 23 (1):1-8.
Reza Lahroodi (2007). Collective Epistemic Virtues. Social Epistemology 21 (3):281 – 297.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads55 ( #75,339 of 1,792,985 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #119,254 of 1,792,985 )
How can I increase my downloads?