Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation
Episteme 2 (1):39-55 (2005)
| Abstract | The doctrinal paradox shows that aggregating individual judgments by taking a majority vote does not always yield a consistent set of collective judgments. Philip Pettit, Luc Bovens, and Wlodek Rabinowicz have recently argued for the epistemic superiority of an aggregation procedure that always yields a consistent set of judgments. This paper identifies several additional epistemic advantages of their consistency maintaining procedure. However, this paper also shows that there are some circumstances where the majority vote procedure is epistemically superior. The epistemic value of maintaining consistency does not always outweigh the epistemic value of making true judgments. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesLuc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2006). Democratic Answers to Complex Questions – an Epistemic Perspective. Synthese 150 (1):131-153.
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2004). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared. Synthese 140 (1-2):207 - 235.
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Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger (2012). Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth. Synthese 187 (1):209-221.
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