David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Episteme 2 (1):39-55 (2005)
The doctrinal paradox shows that aggregating individual judgments by taking a majority vote does not always yield a consistent set of collective judgments. Philip Pettit, Luc Bovens, and Wlodek Rabinowicz have recently argued for the epistemic superiority of an aggregation procedure that always yields a consistent set of judgments. This paper identifies several additional epistemic advantages of their consistency maintaining procedure. However, this paper also shows that there are some circumstances where the majority vote procedure is epistemically superior. The epistemic value of maintaining consistency does not always outweigh the epistemic value of making true judgments.
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References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1985). Concepts of Epistemic Justification. The Monist 68 (1):57-89.
Jody Azzouni (2003). The Strengthened Liar, the Expressive Strength of Natural Languages, and Regimentation. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):329–350.
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2004). Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decisions. An Epistemic Perspective. Ratio Juris 17 (2):241-258.
Bryson Brown (1999). Adjunction and Aggregation. Noûs 33 (2):273-283.
Citations of this work BETA
Kay Mathiesen (2006). The Epistemic Features of Group Belief. Episteme 2 (3):161-175.
Kristina Rolin (2010). Group Justification in Science. Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
Hanne Andersen & Susann Wagenknecht (2013). Epistemic Dependence in Interdisciplinary Groups. Synthese 190 (11):1881-1898.
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