Learning to report one's introspections

Philosophy of Science 42 (September):223-241 (1975)
The author argues for a purely naturalistic underpinning of the linguistic practice of reporting one's introspections. In doing so he avoids any commitments about the ontological status of entities referred to in introspective reports. He also presents evidence of the inadequacy of peripheralistic behaviorism as a naturalistic underpinning of introspective reports. The paper includes (a) a definition of 'introspection' and criticism of alternative definitions, (b) a classification scheme that sorts introspections into six different types, and (c) a presentation of evidence that the reporting of certain of these is based on such fundamental psychological phenomena as stimulus generalization, and possibly also conditioning to covert mediating responses
Keywords Attention  Consciousness  Introspection  Language  Psychology  Response  Science  Stimulus
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DOI 10.1086/288638
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