Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 63 (3):432-451 (1996)
|Abstract||In Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga claims that metaphysical naturalism, when joined to a naturalized epistemology, is self-undermining. Plantinga argues that naturalists are committed to a neoDarwinian account of our origins, and that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is improbable or unknown relative to that theory. If the theory is true, then we are in no position to know that, whereas theism, if true, underwrites cognitive reliability. I seek to turn the tables on Plantinga, showing that neoDarwinism provides strong reasons for expecting general cognitive reliability, whereas the likelihood of that relative to theism is unknowable|
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