Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference
Marcelo Alejandro Falappa, Alejandro Javier García, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Guillermo Ricardo Simari
Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):161-193 (2013)
| Abstract | We propose a revision operator on a stratified belief base, i.e., a belief base that stores beliefs in different strata corresponding to the value an agent assigns to these beliefs. Furthermore, the operator will be defined as to perform the revision in such a way that information is never lost upon revision but stored in a stratum or layer containing information perceived as having a lower value. In this manner, if the revision of one layer leads to the rejection of some information to maintain consistency, instead of being withdrawn it will be kept and introduced in a different layer with lower value. Throughout this development we will follow the principle of minimal change, being one of the important principles proposed in belief change theory, particularly emphasized in the AGM model. Regarding the reasoning part from the stratified belief base, the agent will obtain the inferences using an argumentative formalism. Thus, the argumentation framework will decide which information prevails when sentences of different layers are used for entailing conflicting beliefs. We will also illustrate how inferences are changed and how the status of arguments can be modified after a revision process. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Belief revision AGM model Argumentation systems | |||||||||
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