The basis of first-person authority

Philosophical Topics 28 (2):69-99 (2000)
Abstract
This paper develops an account of the distinctive epistemic authority of avowals of propositional attitude, focusing on the case of belief. It is argued that such avowals are expressive of the very mental states they self-ascribe. This confers upon them a limited self-warranting status, and renders them immune to an important class of errors to which paradigm empirical (e.g., perceptual) judgments are liable.
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Matthew Boyle (2009). Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
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