Philosophy of Science 47 (2):260-276 (1980)
|Abstract||This paper presents an argument for the claim that historical events are unique in a nontrivial sense which entails the inapplicability of the Hempelian D-N model to historical explanations. Some previous criticisms of Hempel are shown to be general criticisms of the D-N model which can be outflanked in cases where a reduction to fundamental laws is available. I then survey grounds for denying that explanations by reasons can be effectively reduced to causal explanations, and for rejecting methodological individualism. I conclude with some positive remarks concerning the structure of historical explanations and sense in which historical events are unique.|
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