Nonmonotonic reasoning based on incomplete logic

Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 7 (4):375-395 (1997)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT What characterizes human reasoning is the ability of dealing with incomplete information. Incomplete logic is developed for modeling incomplete knowledge. The most distinctive feature of incomplete logic is its semantics. This is an alternative presentation of partial semantics. In this paper, we will introduce the general notion of incomplete logic (ICL), compare it with partial logic, and give the resolution method for it. We will also show how ICL can be applied to nonmonotonic reasoning. We define nonmonotonic derivation as monotonic derivation in ICL from the database and some consistent assumptions. The mechanism of ICL makes it easy to assert the consistency of an assumption without asserting the assumption itself.

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References found in this work

Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.
Circumscription — A Form of Non-Monotonic Reasoning.John McCarthy - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):27–39.
Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.

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