Counterparts and Actuality

Mind 114 (453):1-30 (2005)
Abstract
Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we argue that no coherent version of counterpart theory can provide a plausible representation of talk about actuality, and so, we conclude, counterpart theory should be rejected.
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Delia Graff Fara (2009). Dear Haecceitism. Erkenntnis 70 (3):285 - 297.
Delia Graff Fara (2009). Dear Haecceitism. Erkenntnis 70 (3):285–297.

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