Philosophy Research Archives 11:111-125 (1985)
|Abstract||Descartes argues that since there are no certain marks to distinguish waking experiences from dreams, we need to justify our belief that waking experiences are veridical experiences of physical objects while dreams are illusions. He resolves this problem by arguing that the absence of marks distinguishing dreams from waking experiences notwithstanding, we are justified in ascribing different cognitive values to waking experiences and dreams. For, our belief in God rules out any other explanation of the agreement of all our faculties in supporting the instinctive belief that waking experiences are caused by physical objects|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
George Botterill (2008). The Internal Problem of Dreaming: Detection and Epistemic Risk. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):139 – 160.
Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer Michelle Windt (2007). Dreams. In D. Barrett & P. McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming. Praeger Publishers.
Lawrence J. Wichlinski (2000). The Pharmacology of Threatening Dreams. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1016-1017.
Mor Segev (2012). The Teleological Significance of Dreaming in Aristotle. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43:107-141.
M. J. Baker (1954). Sleeping and Waking. Mind 63 (October):539-543.
W. von Leyden (1956). Sleeping and Waking. Mind 65 (April):241-245.
Antti Revonsuo (2000). The Reinterpretation of Dreams: An Evolutionary Hypothesis of the Function of Dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):877-901.
J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2003). Dreaming and the Brain: Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Conscious States. In Edward F. Pace-Schott, Mark Solms, Mark Blagrove & Stevan Harnad (eds.), Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations. Cambridge University Press.
Valdas Noreika (forthcoming). Dreaming and Waking Experiences in Schizophrenia: How Should the (Dis)Continuity Hypotheses Be Approached Empirically?☆. Consciousness and Cognition.
J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2000). Dreaming and the Brain: Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Conscious States. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 23 (6):793-842; 904-1018; 1083-1121.
Daniel C. Dennett (1976). Are Dreams Experiences? Philosophical Review 73 (April):151-71.
Norman Malcolm (1956). Dreaming and Skepticism. Philosophical Review 65 (January):14-37.
Jonathan Ichikawa (2008). Skepticism and the Imagination Model of Dreaming. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):519–527.
I. E. Thomas (1956). Dreams, Part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 197:197-207.
Rainer Schonhammer (2005). 'Typical Dreams' Reflections of Arousal. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (s 4-5):18-37.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads3 ( #212,976 of 722,698 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,006 of 722,698 )
How can I increase my downloads?