Did Tom Kuhn actually meet Tom bayes?

Erkenntnis 68 (1):41 - 53 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Wesley Salmon and John Earman have presented influential Bayesian reconstructions of Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory-change. In this paper I argue that all attempts to give a Bayesian reading of Kuhn’s philosophy of science are fundamentally misguided due to the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory is in fact inconsistent with Kuhn’s account. The reasons for this inconsistency are traced to the role the concept of incommensurability plays with reference to the ‘observational vocabulary’ within Kuhn’s picture of scientific theories. The upshot of the discussion is that it is impossible to integrate both Kuhn’s claims and Bayesianism within a coherent account of theory-change.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Kuhn's changing concept of incommensurability.Howard Sankey - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):759-774.
Paul Feyerabend und Thomas Kuhn.Paul Hoyningen-Huene - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (1):61-83.
The spell of Kuhn on psychology: An exegetical elixir.William O'Donohue - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):267 – 287.
Thomas Kuhn‘s Latest Notion of Incommensurability.Xiang Chen - 1997 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (2):257-273.
Thomas Kuhn and the chemical revolution.Paul Hoyningen-Huene - 2008 - Foundations of Chemistry 10 (2):101-115.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
115 (#142,581)

6 months
3 (#439,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?