In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications (2010)
|Abstract||Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea that the intentional object of a sensory experience must be Independent; that is, an intentional object must be such that its existence doesn’t depend on being experienced (except in some very special cases). This means, for example, that sense-data understood as mind-dependent objects are not intentional objects, because their existence depends on the occurrence of an experience. In the second part of the paper, I will sketch a view of how sensory experiences can acquire an Independent object.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2008). Varieties of Intentional Objects. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17:23-32.
Tim Crane (2001). Intentional Objects. Ratio 14 (4):298-317.
Dale Jacquette (1982). Meinong's Theory of Defective Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 15:1-19.
Tim Crane (2007). Intentionalism. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Keith Lehrer (2011). What Intentionality Is Like. Acta Analytica 26 (1):3-14.
Piotr Błaszczyk (2009). ragmenty ontologii Ingardena. O miejscach niedookreślenia przedmiotu czysto intencjonalnego. Filozofia Nauki 4.
Dale Jacquette (1984). Sensation and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 47 (3):229-40.
Uriah Kriegel (2008). The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.
David W. Smith (1975). Meinongian Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 1:43-71.
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2004). Roman Ingarden. Ontology From a Phenomenological Point of View. Reports on Philosophy 22:121-142.
John Barresi (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.
Bogdan Nita (2012). Intentional Image and Transcendental Image in the Work of Art. Image 2 (2321):231.
Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
Added to index2011-03-03
Total downloads139 ( #3,965 of 722,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)58 ( #873 of 722,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?