David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 47 (2):250-272 (2013)
A report of a person's desire can be true even if its embedded clause underspecifies the content of the desire that makes the report true. It is true that Fiona wants to catch a fish even if she has no desire that is satisfied if she catches a poisoned minnow. Her desire is satisfied only if she catches an edible, meal-sized fish. The content of her desire is more specific than the propositional content of the embedded clause in our true report of her desires. Standard semantic accounts of belief reports require, however, that the embedded clause of a true belief report specify precisely the content of the belief that makes it true. Such accounts of belief reports therefore face what I call "the problem of underspecification" if they are extended to desire reports. Such standard accounts are sometimes refined by requiring that a belief report can be true not only if its subject has a belief with precisely the propositional content specified by its embedded clause, but also only if its subject grasps that content in a particular way. Such refinements do not, however, help to address the problem of underspecification for desire reports.
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Citations of this work BETA
Alex Grzankowski (2014). Attitudes Towards Objects. Noûs 50 (1).
David Braun (2015). Desiring, Desires, and Desire Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):141-162.
Fabrizio Cariani (2014). Attitudes, Deontics and Semantic Neutrality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):491-511.
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