Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis

Philosophia 40 (3):435-447 (2012)
According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we accept that the mind depends on physical events to some extent, this thesis, though not obvious, is compatible with a large variety of views on the mind. The second version applies to standing states only, and has to do with how we conceive the nature of such states. This second version is much more interesting, because it points to a potential tension in our conception of minds or selves. However, without properly distinguishing between the two theses, the significance of the second is obscured by the comparative triviality of the first
Keywords Extended mind  Functionalism and extended mind  Consciousness and extended mind
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-011-9355-0
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References found in this work BETA
Mark Sprevak (2009). Extended Cognition and Functionalism. Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):503-527.

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Mikkel Gerken (2014). Outsourced Cognition. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):127-158.

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