David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-20 (forthcoming)
Some philosophers believe that punishing convicted criminals in order to deter other, potential criminals would be morally questionable even if we had good evidence that doing so would achieve its goal, at least to a substantial degree. And they believe this because they believe that doing so would be an instance of “using” convicted criminals in a morally objectionable way. Tadros aims to show that we would indeed be “using” convicted criminals in such cases but that, while “using” others is ordinarily morally wrong, there are cases in which it is in fact morally permissible (or even morally required). Moreover, he claims that punishing convicted criminals in order to deter other, potential criminals is an instance of “using” others that is sometimes clearly morally justifiable. My aim is to show how extraordinarily interesting some of Tadros’ arguments are but also why, in my view, they fail to establish the view he claims they support. I also suggest some ways in which Tadros might revise his arguments to support his central claim(s) more effectively
|Keywords||Self-defense Self-defense and punishment General deterrence|
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel M. Farrell (1995). Deterrence and the Just Distribution of Harm. Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (2):220-240.
Daniel M. Farrell (1989). On Threats and Punishments. Social Theory and Practice 15 (2):125-154.
Daniel M. Farrell (1990). The Justification of Deterrent Violence. Ethics 100 (2):301-317.
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Victor Tadros (2011). The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law. Oxford University Press.
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