Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208 (2003)
|Abstract||The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access|
|Keywords||Externalism Internal Metaphysics Mind Privileged Access Mckinsey, M|
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