A genealogy of trust

Episteme 4 (3):305-321 (2007)
Abstract
In trusting a speaker we adopt a credulous attitude, and this attitude is basic: it cannot be reduced to the belief that the speaker is trustworthy or reliable. However, like this belief, the attitude of trust provides a reason for accepting what a speaker says. Similarly, this reason can be good or bad; it is likewise epistemically evaluable. This paper aims to present these claims and offer a genealogical justification of them
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Faulkner (2007). What is Wrong with Lying? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):535–557.
Paul Faulkner (2007). What Is Wrong with Lying? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):535-557.
Richard Holton (1994). Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.

View all 9 references

Citations of this work BETA
Michael Fuerstein (2013). Epistemic Trust and Liberal Justification. Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (2):179-199.
Evan Simpson (2013). Reasonable Trust. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):402-423.
Thomas W. Simpson (2012). What Is Trust? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):550-569.

View all 6 citations

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Paul Faulkner (2007). What Is Wrong with Lying? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):535-557.
Paul Faulkner (2007). What is Wrong with Lying? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):535–557.
Richard Holton (1994). Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.
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