Dissertation, University College London (1998)
|Abstract||In Conspiracies and Lyes I aim to provide an epistemological account of testimony as one of our faculties of knowledge. I compare testimony to perception and memory. Its similarity to both these faculties is recognised. A fundamental difference is stressed: it can be rational to not accept testimony even if testimony is fulfilling its proper epistemic function because it can be rational for a speaker to not express a belief; or, as I say, it can be rational for a speaker to lye. This difference in epistemic function provides the basis for a sceptical argument against testimony. Scepticism is presented as a method rather than a problem: considering how to refute the sceptical argument is taken to be a means of evaluating theories as to how testimonial beliefs are warranted. I consider two strategies for refuting scepticism and, correlatively, two accounts of how testimonial beliefs are warranted. I show these accounts to be neutral across all theories of justification that entertain the project of investigating our faculties of knowledge. A reductionist account explains the warrant supporting our testimonial beliefs in terms of our inductive ground for accepting testimony. An anti-reductionist account explains the warrant supporting our testimonial beliefs in terms of our possessing an entitlement to accept testimony. I show how both positions can be intuitively motivated. In presenting reductionism I appeal to probability theory, empirical psychology and invoke David Hume. In presenting anti-reductionism I invoke John McDowell and Tyler Burge. A refutation of scepticism is provided by a hybrid of reductionism and anti-reductionism. The hybrid is conceived as part social externalism and part individual internalism. In developing this account I provide a means of conceptualising the dynamic that exists between individual knowers and communities of knowledge.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Paul Faulkner (2005). On Dreaming and Being Lied To. Episteme 2 (3):149-159.
Paul Faulkner (2011). Knowledge on Trust. OUP Oxford.
Sanford Goldberg & David Henderson (2006). Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):600-617.
Tomoji Shogenji (2006). A Defense of Reductionism About Testimonial Justification of Beliefs. Noûs 40 (2):331–346.
P. Faulkner (2002). On the Rationality of Our Response to Testimony. Synthese 131 (3):353 - 370.
Peter J. Graham (2004). Metaphysical Libertarianism and the Epistemology of Testimony. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):37-50.
Axel Gelfert (2009). Indefensible Middle Ground for Local Reductionism About Testimony. Ratio 22 (2):170-190.
Paul Faulkner (1998). David Hume's Reductionist Epistemology of Testimony. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):302–313.
Paul Faulkner (2011). Epistemology of Testimony. In Östman & Verschueren (eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics. John Benjamins.
Deborah Tollefsen (2007). Group Testimony. Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
Added to index2010-07-26
Total downloads32 ( #37,899 of 549,070 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #12,324 of 549,070 )
How can I increase my downloads?