Episteme 2 (3):149-159 (2005)
|Abstract||As sources of knowledge, perception and testimony are both vulnerable to sceptical arguments. To both arguments a Moorean response is possible: both can be refuted by reference to particular things known by perception and testimony. However, lies and dreams are different possibilities and they are different in a way that undercuts the plausibility of a Moorean response to a scepticism of testimony. The condition placed on testimonial knowledge cannot be trivially satisfi ed in the way the Moorean would suggest. This has substantial implications for any non-sceptical epistemological theory of testimony|
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