David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (1):31-52 (2002)
According to John Searle's theory of human ontology, intentional mental states such as beliefs and wants rely on non-intentional, Background, dispositions to produce rational behaviour. The distinction between intentional and non-intentional states is used as the basis on which to understand the various conceptions of human agency to be found in behavioural finance. The agent of behavioural finance is characterized in terms of three sets of psychological traits: prospect theory, heuristics and mental accounting. These are examined from a Searlean perspective and shown to rely on the interplay between various reflected upon and non-reflected upon elements, in keeping with the Searlean human ontology previously considered. A number of implications are drawn from these findings.
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Andrei Shleifer (2000). Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioural Finance. Oxford University Press Uk.
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