Graduate studies at Western
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
|Abstract||Sometimes also called retro causation. A common feature of our world seems to be that in all cases of causation, the cause and the effect are placed in time so that the cause precedes its effect temporally. Our normal understanding of causation assumes this feature to such a degree that we intuitively have great difficulty imagining things differently. The notion of backward causation, however, stands for the idea that the temporal order of cause and effect is a mere contingent feature and that there may be cases where the cause is causally prior to its effect but where the temporal order of the cause and effect is reversed with respect to normal causation, i.e. there may be cases where the effect temporally, but not causally, precedes its cause.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Adolf Grunbaum (1976). Is Preacceleration of Particles in Dirac's Electrodynamics a Case of Backward Causation? The Myth of Retrocausation in Classical Electrodynamics. Philosophy of Science 43 (2):165-201.
Jonathan Schaffer (2004). Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to Their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation. In Christopher Read Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Basil Blackwell.
Brad Weslake (forthcoming). A Partial Theory of Actual Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
James M. Joyce (2010). Causal Reasoning and Backtracking. Philosophical Studies 147 (1):139 - 154.
Johannes Persson (2002). Cause, Effect, and Fake Causation. Synthese 131 (1):129 - 143.
Huw Price (1996). Backward Causation and the Direction of Causal Processes: Reply to Dowe. Mind 105 (419):467-474.
Uwe Meixner (2004). Causation in a New Old Key. Studia Logica 76 (3):343 - 383.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads53 ( #23,219 of 739,667 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,778 of 739,667 )
How can I increase my downloads?