Erkenntnis 71 (3):303 - 322 (2009)
|Abstract||The present paper surveys the three most prominent accounts in contemporary debates over how sound reduction should be executed. The classical Nagelian model of reduction derives the laws of the target-theory from the laws of the base theory plus some auxiliary premises (so-called bridge laws) connecting the entities of the target and the base theory. The functional model of reduction emphasizes the causal definitions of the target entities referring to their causal relations to base entities. The new-wave model of reduction deduces not the original target theory but an analogous image of it, which remains inside the vocabulary of the base theory. One of the fundamental motivations of both the functional and the new-wave model is to show that bridge laws can be evaded. The present paper argues that bridge laws—in the original Nagelian sense—are inevitable, i.e. that none of these models can evade them. On the one hand, the functional model of reduction needs bridge laws, since its fundamental concept, functionalization, is an inter-theoretical process dealing with entities of two different theories. Theoretical entities of different theories (in a general heterogeneous case) do not have common causal relations, so the functionalization of an entity—without bridge laws—can only be executed in the framework of its own theory. On the other hand, the so-called images of the new-wave account cannot be constructed without the use of bridge laws. These connecting principles are needed to guide the process of deduction within the base theory; without them one would not be able to recognize if the deduced structure was an image of the target theory.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
P. P. Allport (1993). Are the Laws of Physics 'Economical with the Truth'? Synthese 94 (2):245 - 290.
Terence E. Horgan (1978). Supervenient Bridge Laws. Philosophy of Science 45 (2):227-249.
Raphael van Riel (2011). Nagelian Reduction Beyond the Nagel Model. Philosophy of Science 78 (3):353-375.
Terence E. Horgan (2002). Themes in My Philosophical Work. In Johannes L. Brandl (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi.
Michael Esfeld, Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom (2012). Marrying the Merits of Nagelian Reduction and Functional Reduction. Acta Analytica 27 (3):217-230.
Robin Le Poidevin (2005). Missing Elements and Missing Premises: A Combinatorial Argument for the Ontological Reduction of Chemistry. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):117-134.
Hans Lind (1993). A Note on Fundamental Theory and Idealizations in Economics and Physics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):493-503.
Craig Dilworth (1994). Principles, Laws, Theories and the Metaphysics of Science. Synthese 101 (2):223 - 247.
Robin Le Poidevin (2005). Missing Elements and Missing Premises: A Combinatorial Argument for the Ontological Reduction of Chemistry. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):117 - 134.
Kevin Morris (2009). Does Functional Reduction Need Bridge Laws? A Response to Marras. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):647-657.
Added to index2009-07-04
Total downloads64 ( #17,310 of 722,752 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,752 )
How can I increase my downloads?