David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):54-80 (2009)
What exactly is a philosophical intuition? And what makes such an intuition reliable, when it is reliable? This paper provides a terminological framework that is able answer to the first question, and then puts the framework to work developing an answer to the second question. More specifically, the paper argues that we can distinguish between two different "evidential roles" which intuitions can occupy: under certain conditions they can provide information about the representational structure of an intuitor's concept, and under different conditions, they can provide information about whether or not a property is instantiated. The paper describes two principles intended to capture the difference between the two sets of conditions---that is, the paper offers a principle that explains when an intuition will be a reliable source of evidence about the representation structure of an intuitor's concept, and another principle that explains when an intuition will be a reliable source of evidence about whether or not a property is instantiated. The paper concludes by briefly arguing that, insofar as philosophers are interested using intuitions to determine whether or not some philosophically interesting property is instantiated by some scenario (for instance, whether knowledge is instantiated in a Gettier-case), the reliability of the intuition in question does not depend on whether or not the intuition is widely shared.
|Keywords||metaphilosophy epistemology intuitions philosophical naturalism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Felipe De Brigard (2010). If You Like It, Does It Matter If It's Real? Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):43-57.
Bernard Molyneux (2014). New Arguments That Philosophers Don't Treat Intuitions as Evidence. Metaphilosophy 45 (3):441-461.
Sebastian Lutz (2012). Artificial Language Philosophy of Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Browse Results) 2 (2):181–203.
Joanna Demaree-Cotton (2016). Do Framing Effects Make Moral Intuitions Unreliable? Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):1-22.
Erkki Huovinen & Tobias Pontara (2011). Methodology in Aesthetics: The Case of Musical Expressivity. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):45 - 64.
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