David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 55 (1):1 - 16 (2012)
Abstract If we take for granted that introspection is indispensable for the study of conscious mental states, the question arises what criteria have to be met in order for introspective reports to qualify as scientific evidence. There have been some attempts to argue (implicitly or explicitly) that it is possible to provide a satisfactory answer to this question while remaining agnostic with respect to questions about the nature of consciousness. Focusing on the aim of using introspection in order to generate phenomenological descriptions of conscious mental states, this paper argues that such an agnostic stance cannot be maintained, because the very meaning of ?introspection? remains fuzzy as long as we don't have a clear understanding of how the mind does it. I show that current debates revolve around some of the same issues that were already in the background of debates around 1900, and I argue that a satisfactory treatment of introspection as a method cannot be separated from the aim of providing a satisfactory treatment of introspection as a feature of consciousness
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References found in this work BETA
David M. Armstrong (1963). Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible? Philosophical Review 62 (4):417-32.
Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
Uljana Feest & Thomas Sturm (2011). What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? Editors' Introduction. Erkenntnis 75 (3):285-302.
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