Kreativität im Denken. Eine Kritik des Reliabilitätsarguments von John D. Norton gegen rationalistische Epistemologien zur Methode des Gedankenexperiments

In Günter Abel (ed.), Kreativität. Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin (2005)
In this paper I argue that Norton's case against Brown's rationalism about thought experiments suffers from serious shortcomings, which relate to the nature of induction.
Keywords Thought Experiments  Rationalism  Induction  Inference to the best explanation
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Similar books and articles
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2014). Intuitions in Science: Thought Experiments as Argument Pumps. In Anthony R. Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press 119-134.
Ian Hacking (1992). Do Thought Experiments Have a Life of Their Own? Comments on James Brown, Nancy Nersessian and David Gooding. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:302 - 308.
John D. Norton (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.

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