David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):239-262 (2009)
I defend a cluster of views about names from fiction and myth. The views are based on two claims: first, proper names refer directly totheir bearers; and second, names from fiction and myth are genuinely empty, they simply do not refer. I argue that when such names are used in direct discourse, utterances containing them have truth values but do not express propositions. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that if an utterance of, for example, “Vulcan is a planet” fails to express a proposition, then an utterance of “Le Verrier believed that Vulcan is a planet” cannot express a proposition. The argument applies to claims about fiction, such as “Sherlock Holmes is strong,” and claims about the attitudes of authors and auditors. The upshot is a semantics for fictional statements that provides a satisfying way for direct reference theorists to avoid taking fictional entities to be abstract objects and to accept the commonsense view that what is true in a fiction is ultimately a matter of what is pretended to be the case
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References found in this work BETA
John Perry (2009). Reference and Reflexivity. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Saul A. Kripke (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Scott Soames (2002). Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. Oxford University Press.
Kendall L. Walton (1990). Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Harvard University Press.
Robert Stalnaker (1999). Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Min Xu (2015). The Creator-Determining Problem and Conjunctive Creationism About Fictional Characters. Dialogue 54 (3):455-468.
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