David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):361-388 (2015)
In this paper, I construct and defend an account of harm, specifically, all-things-considered overall harm. I start with a simple comparative account, on which an event harms a person provided that she would have been better off had it not occurred. The most significant problems for this account are overdetermination and preemption cases. However, a counterfactual comparative approach of some sort is needed to make sense of harm, or so I argue. I offer a counterfactual comparative theory that accounts nicely for such cases, by taking claims about harm to be, potentially, irreducibly plural. In some cases, there are some events such that they are harmful, even if no one of them is such that it is harmful. I try to work out the details
|Keywords||harm comparative harm extrinsic value counterfactuals death|
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Ben Bradley (2009). Well-Being and Death. Oxford University Press.
Seana Valentine Shiffrin (1999). Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm. Legal Theory 5 (2):117-148.
George Boolos (1984). To Be is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables). Journal of Philosophy 81 (8):430-449.
Citations of this work BETA
Travis Timmerman (2016). Your Death Might Be the Worst Thing Ever to Happen to You. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):18-37.
Nathan Hanna (2015). Harm: Omission, Preemption, Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
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