Rationality and puzzling beliefs

The author presents and defends a general view about belief. and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke’s puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke’s original puzzle, which have to do with belief attributions containing empty names and kind terms
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00091.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1979). Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Neil Feit (2009). Naming and Nonexistence. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):239-262.

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