Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs

Abstract
The author presents and defends a general view about belief. and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke’s puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke’s original puzzle, which have to do with belief attributions containing empty names and kind terms
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Citations of this work BETA
Neil Feit (2009). Naming and Nonexistence. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):239-262.
Similar books and articles
Neil Feit (2001). Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29-55.
Alan Berger (ed.) (2011). Saul Kripke. Cambridge University Press.
Ralph Wedgwood (2011). Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. 180--200.
Igal Kvart (1987). Kripke's Belief Puzzle. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):287-325.
Jeff Malpas (2008). On Not Giving Up the World - Davidson and the Grounds of Belief. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):201 – 215.
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