Some crucial issues of mind-body monism

Synthese 22 (May):295-312 (1971)
Assuming that the qualities of immediate experience ('sentience') are the subjective aspect of the neurophysiological cerebral processes, And assuming that all behavior is ultimately susceptible to physical explanation, There are a number of ways in which mind-Body monism can be stated. But there are also a number of serious difficulties for a logically coherent formulation of the identity thesis of the mental and the physical
Keywords Body  Epistemology  Identity  Mind  Reduction
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413429
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References found in this work BETA
Kenneth F. Schaffner (1967). Approaches to Reduction. Philosophy of Science 34 (2):137-147.

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Citations of this work BETA
Arnold B. Levison (1983). An Epistemic Criterion of the Mental. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):389 - 407.

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