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  • Herbert Feigl (1971). Some Crucial Issues of Mind-Body Monism. Synthese 22 (May):295-312.
    Russellian Monism in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 86.7R. de Boer (1976). Cartesian Categories in Mind-Body Identity Theories. Philosophical Forum 7:139-58.
    Mind-Brain Identity Theory in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 84.3Yunusa K. Salami (1991). Anomalous Monism and the Mind-Body Problem. Quest 5 (2):106-114.
    Anomalous Monism in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 78.4James W. Cornman (1962). The Identity of Mind and Body. Journal of Philosophy 59 (August):486-92.
    Mind-Brain Identity Theory in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 77.1Laurence F. Mucciolo (1974). Scientific Reduction and the Mind-Body Problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Suppl.) 185:185-204.
    Psychophysical Reduction, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 75.9Benny Shanon (2008). Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
    The mind-body problem concerns the relationship between mind and body, or nowadays - between mind or consciousness and the brain. As a relationship, this can be viewed from two perspectives: from body to mind and from mind to body. In this note I point out that the two readings of the problem are not symmetrical and that there are categorical differences between them. In particular, whereas the body to mind problem constitutes a mystery (cf. the contemporary hard problem), the mind (...) to body problem may be approached from a psychological (as contrasted with philosophical) orientation that allows for concrete phenomenological investigation. (shrink)
    No categories
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  • 74.7Herbert Feigl (1975). Russell and Schlick: A Remarkable Agreement on a Monistic Solution of the Mind-Body Problem. Erkenntnis 9 (May):11-34.
    Russellian Monism in Philosophy of Mind
    Bertrand Russell in 20th Century Philosophy
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  • 70.8Fanny L. Epstein (1973). The Metaphysics of Mind-Body Identity Theories. American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (April):111-121.
    Mind-Brain Identity Theory in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 70.8Clive Vernon Borst (1970). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: A Collection of Papers;. New York,St Martin's P..
    Mind body, not a pseudo-problem, by H. Feigl.--Is consciousness a brain process? by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--The nature of mind, by D. M. Armstrong.--Materialism as a scientific hypothesis, by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes: a reply to J. J. C. Smart, by J. T. Stevenson.--Further remarks on sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--Smart on sensations, by K. Baier.--Brain processes and incorrigibility, by J. J. C. Smart.--Could mental states be brain (...) processes? by J. Shaffer.--The identity of mind and body, by J. Cornman.--Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes, by R. Coburn.--Mental events and the brain, by J. Shaffer.--Comment: mental events and the brain, by P. Feyerabend.--Materialism and the mind-body problem, by P. Feyerabend.--Materialism, by J. J. C. Smart.--Scientific materialism and the identity theory, by N. Malcolm.--Professor Malcolm on scientific materialism and the identity theory, by E. Sosa.--Rejoinder to Mr. Sosa, by N. Malcolm.--Mind-body identity, privacy and categories, by R. Rorty.--Physicalism, by T. Nagel.--Mind-body identity, a side issue? by C. Taylor.--Illusions and identity, by J. M. Hinton.--Bibliography (p. [259]-261). (shrink)
    Identity in Metaphysics
    Mind-Brain Identity Theory in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 70.6Mehdi Nasrin (2004). Anomalous Monism in Carnap's Aufbau. Erkenntnis 60 (3):283-293.
    The Logical Reconstruction of the World (Aufbau) is oneof the major works of Rudolf Carnap in which he attempts to putan end to some of the traditional disputes in epistemologyby using what he calls `construction theory'. According tothis theory, one or more constructional systems can be designedin which all the scientific and pre-scientific objects are logicallymade out of a limited number of basic elements. Carnap introducessome options for the basis of this system and chooses thedomain of the autopsychological, i.e., the (...) domain of privateelementary experiences, among them and tries to construct all theconcepts out of them. This phenomenalistic reduction sometimes isseen as embracing a Cartesian dualism of mind and body or even amentalistic monism. However, in this paper, I shall try to showthat the traditional dualist-monist debates are among those disputesthat the construction theory aims to get rid of. I will show thatCarnap's position on the mind-body problem is really close towhat Davidson later termed as `Anomalous Monism' and that thisis why Carnap fails to complete his logical construction at a crucial step. Whenever possible, logicalconstructions are to be substituted forinferred entities. (shrink)
    Anomalous Monism in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 70.2Clark W. Butler (1972). The Mind-Body Problem: A Nonmaterialistic Identity Thesis. Idealistic Studies 2 (September):229-48.
    Mind-Body Problem, General in Philosophy of Mind
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