Basic intrinsic value
Philosophical Studies 99 (3):319-346 (2000)
| Abstract | Hedonism: the view that (i) pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good, and (ii) pain is the only thing that is intrinsically bad; furthermore, the view that (iii) a complex thing such as a life, a possible world, or a total consequence of an action is intrinsically good iff it contains more pleasure than pain. | |||||||||
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