Basic intrinsic value

Philosophical Studies 99 (3):319-346 (2000)
Abstract
Hedonism: the view that (i) pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good, and (ii) pain is the only thing that is intrinsically bad; furthermore, the view that (iii) a complex thing such as a life, a possible world, or a total consequence of an action is intrinsically good iff it contains more pleasure than pain.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1023/A:1018614917379
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Eden Lin (2015). The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):99-114.
Fred Feldman (2002). The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):604-628.
Ben Bradley (2006). Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):111 - 130.

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