David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Disagreement is common: even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This volume examines the epistemology of disagreement. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: but this will be the first book focusing on the general epistemic issues arising from informed disagreement. Ten leading philosophers offer specially written essays which together will offer a starting-point for future work on this topic.
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Citations of this work BETA
John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo (forthcoming). Matters of Ambiguity: Faultless Disagreement, Relativism and Realism. Philosophical Studies.
Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2010). Accentuate the Negative. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.
David Christensen (2014). Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity. Noûs 49 (4):n/a-n/a.
Nathan L. King (2012). Disagreement: What's the Problem? Or A Good Peer is Hard to Find. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):249-272.
Rik Peels & Anthony Robert Booth (2014). Why Responsible Belief Is Permissible Belief. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):75-88.
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