Epistemological puzzles about disagreement

In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press 216-236 (2006)
My conclusion will be that, more often than we might have thought, suspension of judgment is the epistemically proper attitude. It follows that in such cases we lack reasonable belief and so, at least on standard conceptions, knowledge. This is a kind of contingent real-world skepticism that has not received the attention it deserves. I hope that this paper will help to bring this issue to life.
Keywords agnosticism
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