Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board

Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23 (2009)
Abstract
In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies. These studies also illustrate some problems that pertain to all of the studies that have been run thus far.
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References found in this work BETA
J. Cover & John Hawthorne (1996). Free Agency and Materialism. In Daniel Howard-Snyder & J. Scott Jordan (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality. Rowman and Littlefield.

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