Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145 (2003)
|Abstract||We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.|
|Keywords||Agency Explanation Free Will Metaphysics Reasons O'connor, T|
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