Review of paradoxes afflicting various voting procedures where one out of m candidates (m ≥ 2) must be elected [Book Review]
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||The paper surveys 17 deterministic electoral procedures for selecting one out of two or more candidates, as well as the susceptibility of each of these procedures to various paradoxes. A detailed appendix exemplifies the paradoxes to which each electoral procedure is susceptible. It is concluded that from the perspective of vulnerability to serious paradoxes, as well as in light of additional technical criteria, Copeland’s or Kemeny’s proposed procedures are the most desirable.|
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