David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 55 (June):218-27 (1988)
A tempting argument for human rationality goes like this: it is more conducive to survival to have true beliefs than false beliefs, so it is more conducive to survival to use reliable belief-forming strategies than unreliable ones. But reliable strategies are rational strategies, so there is a selective advantage to using rational strategies. Since we have evolved, we must use rational strategies. In this paper I argue that some criticisms of this argument offered by Stephen Stich fail because they rely on unsubstantiated interpretations of some results from experimental psychology. I raise two objections to the argument: (i) even if it is advantageous to use rational strategies, it does not follow that we actually use them; and (ii) natural selection need not favor only or even primarily reliable belief-forming strategies
|Keywords||Belief Epistemology Natural Selection Rationality Reliability Stich, S|
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Patrick Rysiew (2008). Rationality Disputes – Psychology and Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1153-1176.
Greg Littmann (2011). Darwin's Doubt Defended: Why Evolution Supports Skepticism. Philosophical Papers 40 (1):81-103.
Ishtiyaque Haji (1992). Evolution, Altruism, and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Biology and Philosophy 7 (2):161-175.
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