Second-Best Realism and Functional Pragmatism

Abstract The functional pragmatism advocated by Nicholas Rescher derives from the conviction that we have no strict evidence for the existence of extramental reality and therefore must postulate it in order to make any sense of truth, communication, and scientific projects. This essay challenges Rescher’s starting point by arguing that the reason extramental reality cannot be argued to is because it is immediately evident. But then to claim that one must postulate it is to adopt only a second-best kind of realism
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