David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):80–84 (1997)
In the last decade, some feminist epistemologists have suggested that the global scepticism which results from the Cartesian dream argument is the product of a self‐consciously masculine modern era, whose philosophy gave pride of place to the individual cognizer, disconnected from the object of knowledge, from other knowers, indeed from his own body. Lorraine Code claims that under a conception of a cognizer as an essentially social being, Cartesian scepticism would not arise. I argue that this is false: an argument parallel in structure, and as well supported as the first‐person Cartesian dream argument, could arise in an epistemology which recognizes the social nature of human life and knowledge. Against Code, it is not the first‐personhood of Cartesianism which generates scepticism. A second‐person scepticism could emerge in a socially conscious epistemology
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Barry Stroud (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford University Press.
Lynn Hankinson Nelson (1990). Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism. Temple University Press.
Susan R. Bordo (1987). The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture. State University of New York Press.
Lorraine Code (1991). What Can She Know? Cornell University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Evelyn Brister (2009). Feminist Epistemology, Contextualism, and Philosophical Skepticism. Metaphilosophy 40 (5):671-688.
Paul Faulkner (2005). On Dreaming and Being Lied To. Episteme 2 (3):149-159.
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