True and Useful: On the Structure of a Two Level Normative Theory

Utilitas 24 (02):151-171 (2012)
Abstract
Act-utilitarianism and other theories in normative ethics confront the implementability problem: normal human agents, with normal human epistemic abilities, lack the information needed to use those theories directly for the selection of actions. Two Level Theories have been offered in reply. The theoretical level component states alleged necessary and sufficient conditions for moral rightness. That component is supposed to be true, but is not intended for practical use. It gives an account of objective obligation. The practical level component is offered as an implementable system for the choice of actions by agents lacking some relevant information. It gives an account of subjective obligation. Several different ways of developing Two Levelism are explained and criticized. Five conditions that must be satisfied if the practical level principle is to be a good match for a given theoretical level principle are stated. A better form of Two Levelism is presented.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Daniel Doviak (2011). A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):259-272.
    Fred Feldman (1995). Adjusting Utility for Justice. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):567 - 585.

    View all 11 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Similar books and articles
    Ben Goertzel (1992). What is Hierarchical Selection? Biology and Philosophy 7 (1):27-33.
    Martin Davies (1989). Connectionism, Modularity and Tacit Knowledge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (December):541-55.
    Fritz Rohrlich (2004). Realism Despite Cognitive Antireductionism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):73 – 88.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2012-05-23

    Total downloads

    80 ( #13,403 of 1,089,047 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    3 ( #30,948 of 1,089,047 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  is 1 thread in this forum