Timmermann's new paradox of hedonism: Neither new nor paradoxical
Analysis 66 (289):76–82 (2006)
| Abstract | ...there can be cases in which we reject pleasure because there is too much of it. Sometimes we decide that pleasure is bad, or not worth having, not because of an extrinsic factor like moral, aesthetic etc. constraints but rather because one is experiencing enough pleasure to the point that more would in itself be undesirable. (2005: 144). | |||||||||
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