David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In M. Milkowski & K. Talmont-Kaminski (eds.), Beyond Description: Normativity in Naturalized Philosophy. College Publication (2010)
Intuitions play an important role in contemporary philosophy. It is common for theories in epistemology, morality, semantics and metaphysics to be rejected because they are inconsistent with a widely and firmly held intuition. Our goal in this paper is to explore the role of epistemic intuitions in epistemology from a naturalistic perspective. Here is the question we take to be central: (Q) Ought we to trust our epistemic intuitions as evidence in support of our epistemological theories? We will understand this question as employing an epistemic ‘ought’ – insofar as we aim at developing a correct epistemological theory, ought we to trust our epistemic intuitions as evidence for or against our epistemological theories? As it stands, (Q) needs further clarification. Whether something is trustworthy is relative to what (a) what it is and (b) what we’re asking it to do. Sam might trust Marie but not George to care for his children, while he might trust both to care for his pet fish. So in order to address (Q), we first need to explore two questions: What are epistemic intuitions? And what sort of epistemological theories do we want? We will take up each of these questions in the following sections.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
E. Schultz, E. T. Cokely & A. Feltz (2011). Persistent Bias in Expert Judgments About Free Will and Moral Responsibility: A Test of the Expertise Defense. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.
Adam Feltz & Florian Cova (2014). Moral Responsibility and Free Will: A Meta-Analysis. Consciousness and Cognition 30:234-246.
Jason S. Miller & Adam Feltz (2011). Frankfurt and the Folk: An Experimental Investigation of Frankfurt-Style Cases. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):401-414.
Adam Feltz & Melissa Millan (2013). An Error Theory for Compatibilist Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):529-555.
Adam Feltz (2015). Experimental Philosophy of Actual and Counterfactual Free Will Intuitions. Consciousness and Cognition 36:113-130.
Similar books and articles
Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). The Epistemology of Ethical Intuitions. Philosophy 86 (336):175-200.
Edouard Machery (2012). Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to Devitt. Theoria 27 (2):223-227.
Michael Devitt (2012). Semantic Epistemology: Response to Machery. Theoria 27 (2):229-233.
Joel Pust, Intuition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Antony Eagle (2008). Mathematics and Conceptual Analysis. Synthese 161 (1):67–88.
Elke Brendel (2004). Intuition Pumps and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments. Dialectica 58 (1):89–108.
Kent Bach (2002). Seemingly Semantic Intuitions. In Joseph K. Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth - Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press 21--33.
Duncan Pritchard (2006). A Defence of Quasi-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophica 78.
Kevin Meeker (2006). Was Hume a Proper Functionalist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):120–136.
Edouard Machery (2012). Expertise and Intuitions About Reference. Theoria 27 (1):37-54.
Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.
Adam Feltz (2008). Problems with the Appeal to Intuition in Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):131 – 141.
Sarah Wright (2009). The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):91-112.
Added to index2012-08-31
Total downloads28 ( #136,634 of 1,792,259 )
Recent downloads (6 months)28 ( #29,425 of 1,792,259 )
How can I increase my downloads?