David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Biolinguistics 6 (3--47):276--307 (2012)
Embodiment and embeddedness define an attractive framework to the study of cognition. I discuss whether theory of mind, i.e. the ability to attribute mental states to others to predict and explain their behaviour, fits these two principles. In agreement with available evidence, embodied cognitive processes may underlie the earliest manifestations of social cognitive abilities such as infants’ selective behaviour in spontaneous-response false belief tasks. Instead, late theory-of-mind abilities, such as the capacity to pass the (elicited-response) false belief test at age four, depend on children’s ability to explain people’s reasons to act in conversation with adults. Accordingly, rather than embodied, late theory-of-mind abilities are embedded in an external linguistic practice.
|Keywords||embodied and embedded cognition false belief test social cognition social understanding theory of mind|
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Marco Fenici (2013). Social Cognitive Abilities in Infancy: Is Mindreading the Best Explanation? Philosophical Psychology 28 (3):387-411.
Marco Fenici (2015). A Simple Explanation of Apparent Early Mindreading: Infants’ Sensitivity to Goals and Gaze Direction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):497-515.
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