Online research in philosophy

A lively dialogue between a foreign philosopher and a powerful statesman, Plato's Laws reflects the essence of the philosopher's reasoning on political theory and practice. It also embodies his mature and more practical ideas about a utopian republic. Plato's discourse ranges from everyday issues of criminal and matrimonial law to wider considerations involving the existence of the gods, the nature of the soul, and the problem of evil. Translated by the distinguished scholar Benjamin Jowett, this edition is an authoritative choice for students of philosophy, political science, and literature.

A lively dialogue between a foreign philosopher and a powerful statesman, Plato's Laws reflects the essence of the philosopher's reasoning on political theory and practice. It also embodies his mature and more practical ideas about a utopian republic. Plato's discourse ranges from everyday issues of criminal and matrimonial law to wider considerations involving the existence of the gods, the nature of the soul, and the problem of evil. Translated by the distinguished scholar Benjamin Jowett, this edition is an authoritative choice for students of philosophy, political science, and literature.

The soul of Achilles -- Aristotle -- The doubleness of soul -- Out of itself for the sake of itself -- Nutritive soul -- Sensing soul: vision -- Thinking soul. Sensation and imagination ; Passive and active mind ; Imagination and thought -- The soul as self and self-aware -- "The father of the Logos" -- "For the friend is another self" -- Herodotus: the rest and motion of soul -- Rest in motion: Herodotus's Egypt -- Motion at rest: Herodotus's Scythians -- Euripides: soul as same and other -- The fake that launched a thousand ships: the duplicity of identity in the Helen -- Euripides among the Athenians: the double vision of soul in Iphigeneia among the Taurians -- Plato -- The soul of the law: Gyges in Herodotus and in Plato -- The subject of justice: on Plato's Cleitophon -- The object of tyranny: Plato's Hipparchus -- Plato's Phaedrus: Er's and the structure of soul -- The grammar of soul: the middle voice in Plato's Euthyphro -- The soul of Socrates.

We will investigate the relation between the notion of the craft of ruling in the "Euthydemus" and in the "Republic". In the "Euthydemus", Socrates' search for an account of wisdom leads to his identifying it as the craft of ruling in the city. In the "Republic", the craft of ruling in the city is the virtue of wisdom in the city and the analogue of wisdom in the soul. Still, the craft of ruling leads to aporia in the former dialogue while in the latter it is a central feature of Socrates' account of justice -- both in the city and in the soul. Some commentators hold that the aporia at the end of the second protreptic interlude of the "Euthydemus" shows that Socrates' account of wisdom is fatally flawed and must be rejected. However, the difficulty for this position is that the craft of ruling from the "Euthydemus" is a hardy notion that plays an extremely important role in the "Republic". Indeed, reflecting this fact, other commentators hold that the aporia is solved in the "Republic". Still, what is so far missing is an analysis that clearly shows the way to this solution in the "Republic". In what follows, we will analyze the two protreptic inter-ludes in the "Euthydemus" in order to see how the aporia arises. As we shall see, Socrates presents the aporia as a labyrinth. Indeed, it is a labyrinth with a little noticed step that -- once it is noticed -- shows the way out. The result will be that the aporia of the "Euthydemus" points to a solution in which ruling in the soul implies a command of one's appetites and emotions.

We will investigate the relation between the notion of the craft of ruling in the Euthydemus and in the Republic. In the Euthydemus, Socrates' search for an account of wisdom leads to his identifying it as the craft of ruling in the city. In the Republic, the craft of ruling in the city is the virtue of wisdom in the city and the analogue of wisdom in the soul. Still, the craft of ruling leads to aporia in the former dialogue while in the latter it is a central feature of Socrates' account of justice - both in the city and in the soul. Some commentators hold that the aporia at the end of the second protreptic interlude of the Euthydemus shows that Socrates' account of wisdom is fatally flawed and must be rejected. However, the difficulty for this position is that the craft of ruling from the Euthydemus is a hardy notion that plays an extremely important role in the Republic. Indeed, reflecting this fact, other commentators hold that the aporia is solved in the Republic. Still, what is so far missing is an analysis that clearly shows the way to this solution in the Republic. In what follows, we will analyze the two protreptic interludes in the Euthydemus in order to see how the aporia arises. As we shall see, Socrates presents the aporia as a labyrinth. Indeed, it is a labyrinth with a little noticed step that - once it is noticed - shows the way out. The result will be that the aporia of the Euthydemus points to a solution in which ruling in the soul implies a command of one's appetites and emotions.

Plato’s depiction of the first city in the Republic (Book II), the so-called ‘city of pigs’, is often read as expressing nostalgia for an earlier, simpler era in which moral norms were secure. This goes naturally with readings of other Platonic texts (including Republic I and the Gorgias) as expressing a sense of moral decline or crisis in Plato’s own time. This image of Plato as a spokesman for ‘moral nostalgia’ is here traced in various nineteenth- and twentieth-century interpretations, and rejected. Plato’s pessimism about human nature in fact precludes any easy assumption that things, or people, were better in the old days.

Plato's Republic: the argument with Polemarchus.--Plato's Republic: the argument with Thrasymachus.--Plato's Republic: the nature of the soul.--Plato's Republic: the comparison between the soul and the state.--Plato's Republic: the proof that the most just man is the happiest.--Aristotle's definition of moral virtue and Plato's account of justice in the soul.--Purposive action.--A comparison of Kant's idealism with that of Berkeley.--The syntheses of sense and understanding in Kant's Kritik of pure reason.--The schematism of the categories in Kant's Kritik of pure reason.--The concept of evolution.