Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):352-372 (2003)
|Abstract||The purpose of this essay is to account for privileged access or, more precisely, the special kind of epistemic right that we have to some beliefs about our own mental states. My account will have the following two main virtues. First of all, it will only appeal to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. Secondly, it will constitute a naturalizing account of privileged access in that it does not posit any mysterious faculty of introspection or "inner perception" mechanism|
|Keywords||Belief Epistemology Justification Mind Perceptual Privileged Access|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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