Privileged access naturalized

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):352-372 (2003)
The purpose of this essay is to account for privileged access or, more precisely, the special kind of epistemic right that we have to some beliefs about our own mental states. My account will have the following two main virtues. First of all, it will only appeal to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. Secondly, it will constitute a naturalizing account of privileged access in that it does not posit any mysterious faculty of introspection or "inner perception" mechanism
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Justification  Mind  Perceptual  Privileged Access
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00317
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,661
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jordi Fernandez (2007). Desire and Self-Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517-536.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

106 ( #28,497 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

12 ( #56,985 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.