Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):102 - 105 (2005)
|Abstract||Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.|
|Keywords||Belief Epistemology Justification Privileged Access Self-knowledge Zimmerman, A|
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