David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556 (2005)
I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore’s paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in question can account for both versions of Moore’s paradox. Moore’s paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one’s own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one’s own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis.
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References found in this work BETA
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Richard A. Moran (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1980). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Basil Blackwell.
Alvin Goldman (1979). ``What is Justified Belief?". In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel 1-25.
Sydney Shoemaker (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
David James Barnett (2016). Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief. Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
Jordi Fernández (2010). Thought Insertion and Self-Knowledge. Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.
Jordi Fernández (2013). Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):379-400.
John N. Williams (2015). Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey. Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.
John N. Williams (2015). Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey. Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.
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