Un examen de la argumentación de Frege contra la definibilidad de la verdad (An Examination of Frege's Argumentation Against the Definability of Truth)

Theoria 11 (3):165-176 (1996)
Abstract
La argumentación de Frege contra la definibilidad de la verdad pretende mostrar que una definición de verdad es circular o nos involucra en un regreso al infinito. En la obra de Frege cabe distinguir dos nociones de verdad: la verdad expresada mediante el termine “verdadero” y la verdad expresada mediante la aserción. La argumentación de Frege no muestra que el términe “verdadero” sea indefinible, pero, si se acepta la concepción de Frege acerca de la aserción, de su argumentación, adecuadamente reformulada, cabe concluir la indefinibilidad de la verdad en su segunda acepción.Frege’s argumentation against the definability of truth aims to show that a definition of truth is circular or involves us in an infinite regress. In Frege’s work two notions of truth can be distinguished: truth expressed by the word “true” and truth conveyed by the assertion. Frege’s argumentation does not show that the word “true” is undefinable, but, if Frege’s view on assertion is accepted, then from his argumentation, suitably reformulated, the undefinability of truth in the second sense can be concluded
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,999
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Dirk Greimann (2007). Did Frege Really Consider Truth as an Object? Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):125-148.
Wolfgang Künne (2008). Frege on Truths, Truth and the True. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):5-42.
Verena Mayer (2007). Evidence, Judgment and Truth. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):175-197.
Peter Carruthers (1981-1982). Frege's Regress. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82:17 - 32.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-03-18

Total downloads

4 ( #254,577 of 1,101,078 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #177,033 of 1,101,078 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.