Un examen de la argumentación de Frege contra la definibilidad de la verdad (An Examination of Frege's Argumentation Against the Definability of Truth)
Theoria 11 (3):165-176 (1996)
| Abstract | La argumentación de Frege contra la definibilidad de la verdad pretende mostrar que una definición de verdad es circular o nos involucra en un regreso al infinito. En la obra de Frege cabe distinguir dos nociones de verdad: la verdad expresada mediante el termine “verdadero” y la verdad expresada mediante la aserción. La argumentación de Frege no muestra que el términe “verdadero” sea indefinible, pero, si se acepta la concepción de Frege acerca de la aserción, de su argumentación, adecuadamente reformulada, cabe concluir la indefinibilidad de la verdad en su segunda acepción.Frege’s argumentation against the definability of truth aims to show that a definition of truth is circular or involves us in an infinite regress. In Frege’s work two notions of truth can be distinguished: truth expressed by the word “true” and truth conveyed by the assertion. Frege’s argumentation does not show that the word “true” is undefinable, but, if Frege’s view on assertion is accepted, then from his argumentation, suitably reformulated, the undefinability of truth in the second sense can be concluded | |||||||||
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